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The phenomenology of professional practice: A currere 1 
Abstract: In the shift to a more clearly economic imperative for universities than social 
good, the relationship between higher education teaching and professional practice has 
become increasingly apparent. It is seen in the courses offered by universities, and the 
relationship with employment and employers advocated by government and funding 
agencies. From a social realism perspective, this paper envisions all high-level vocational 
education as professional and discusses how an understanding of the phenomenology of 
practice could help to define how it might be structured and by whom it may be best 
delivered. 
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This paper concerns a phenomenological analysis of practice through the lens of social 
realism. It leads to a proposed curriculum of self-understanding, or currere, for the 
practice of becoming a professional.2 The phenomenological approach is grounded upon 
the works of Heidegger (1962), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Bourdieu (1990), which are 
used to engage with the principles of social realism found, for example, in Young 
(2008), Beck (2009), Maton and Moore (2010), Moore (2013) and Wheelahan (2010). 
This exploration offers practice ‘possibilities for creating formative relations between 
being and acting between who we are and how we act’ (van Manen 2007, 13).  
Specifically, it appeals to the notion of currere to reflect the embodiment of 
being through practice in social settings. A currere is the realisation of the multiplicity 
and the weaving of context that helps an understanding and supports one’s becoming. It 
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is not a curriculum for the development of generic employability skills for students (see 
Andrews and Higson 2008, for a critique of such an approaches), but as a way of 
becoming a professional. The hope is that a currere, a lifetime journey, might 
reconceptualise professional practice curriculum (Pinar and Grumet 1976), from a 
course outline to what Pinar calls ‘a complicated conversation’ (Pinar 2011, 47). In 
doing so it creates ‘lucid and legitimate thinking of the ontological potential of humans’ 
(Magrini 2010, 1).  
To realise this, I turn to social realism as an approach that 
treats both the social basis of knowledge and the knowledge itself as real. It follows 
that instead of concentrating solely on ideology critique, a social realist approach to 
the curriculum seeks to identify the social conditions that might be necessary if 
objective knowledge is to be acquired. (Young 2008, 165)  
To expand, Moore argues that social realism is a ‘sociological approach that 
attempts to work through the implications of critical realism (CR) in relation to 
education’ (2013, 336). Moore also confronts the Platonic dilemma inherent in social 
realism: if knowledge is objective it can’t be social, and if it is social it can’t be 
knowledge! He does this by producing a solution to the potentially irreconcilable 
division between epistemology and sociology of knowledge, proposing object criteria 
for knowledge that are enacted in practice rather than enshrined in propositional 
knowledge. Such an approach is opposed to standardisation and the closing down or 
suppression of what a profession might be (Beck 2009; Beck and Young 2005). It 
implies a critical capability: an ability to engage in practice based on active engagement 
with acquired knowledge and demonstrable understanding.  
This paper is in three sections. The first considers various notions of being social 
through practice and the possible tensions between the two approaches of social realism 
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and phenomenology. The second considers curriculum and the ontological concept of 
currere as a guide to professional development through practice, and the final section 
proposes a currere for professional practice. 
Section 1: Practices are with others 
Schatzki (1996) suggests that practice is ‘a temporally unfolding and spatially dispersed 
nexus of doings and sayings’ (1996, 89). This meaning differs from doing things, which 
the ‘Western philosophical tradition has opposed to theory: theory versus practice, 
contemplation and reflection versus doing’ (1996, 90). It is this use of the term 
‘practice’ and how the common rules for practice might be understood that mainly 
concern us here. This familiarity becomes the ‘presupposed basis of any thoughts 
[which] are taken for granted and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse them and 
bring them into view we have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, xiii). It is this actuality that a phenomenological analysis of 
practice is intended to reveal. Following Bourdieu, the logic of this practical awareness 
is not distinct from, nor reducible to, formal logic. The logic of this practical approach 
is a ‘logic that is intelligible, coherent but only up to a certain point (beyond which it 
would no longer be “practical”), and oriented towards practical ends, that is, the 
actualization of wishes, or desire (of life or of death), etc’ (Bourdieu 1998, 132). This 
applies to all modes of knowledge that cannot be translated into conceptual; theoretical 
representations are ‘corporeal, relational, temporal, situational and actionable 
knowledge’ (Van Manen 2007, 22). To understand professional practice, we need to 
question its notions of acceptable knowledge; its creation and its purpose. Especially in 
the context of a professional body (Beck and Young 2005), we need to be aware of how 
reconceptualising agencies (Bernstein 2000) can filter what is known through 
4 
 
curriculum control and attestation.  
Bernstein’s advocacy (see also Jones and Moore 1995) on such disruptions of 
‘taken for granted’ knowledge has resonance with Heidegger’s proposal that 
understanding is through how we act within the ‘taken for granted’ context. When these 
context are disturbed, we are ‘awakened’ towards the referential totality that previously 
had been encountered without question. Such disruption draws our attention and in 
response we reorient and reassess our relationship to the newly disclosed circumstances. 
It is not just a matter of what others might consider appropriate or what had previously 
been available; it is what one cares about and directs one’s attention to in the processes 
of certain practices. It is not just an intellectual review of change; rather, it is constituted 
with a sense of dislocation, turning the ‘taken for granted’ familiarity of the context and 
exposing it as a new context requiring careful understanding and conspicuous action. 
This theme is taken up by Merleau-Ponty in his account of how we assimilate 
such disruptions and regain our sense of equilibrium. Drawing on this work, Dreyfus 
argues that practices ‘are acquired by dealing with things and situations, and in turn they 
determine how things and situations show up for us as requiring our responses’ (2002, 
368). For Heidegger, the habitus or epoch by which our practices gain their meaning is 
a web of social practices into which we are ‘thrown’ and through which we can express 
ourselves and grasp our future possibilities. Within any epoch our understanding of 
identity will evidentially be an interpretation of our accumulated experience, choices 
and future actions.  
This understanding of ourselves in our every-day-ness is, as Heidegger 
proposes, a making ourselves at home in the world. It is the management of this process 
without inappropriate loss of either self-concern or being with others that Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) conceptualises as ‘maximum grip’ on reality. Merleau-Ponty and, more recently, 
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Kemmis and Smith (2008) suggest that expert practitioners are ‘searching for saliencies’ 
in settings to inform practice within both their conceptual and contextual boundaries. 
For example, when we are looking at something, without thinking about it we tend to 
find the best distance for taking in both the object as a whole and its different parts. 
When grasping something, we tend to grab it in such a way as to get the best grip. In so 
doing, the totality of the event is presented in the actuality of our response. 
Social realists’ development of critical realism departs from, although does not 
reject, the phenomenological outlined above. Maton and Moore (2010) describe the 
major concern of the ‘social realist school is to replace this “either/or” with a refined 
and developed “both/and”’. This alternative view recognises, contra positivism, the 
inescapably social character of knowledge but, contra constructivism, does not take this 
inevitably to entail relativism. In other words, rational objectivity in knowledge is 
acknowledged as itself a fact (we do actually have knowledge), but it is also recognised 
as a social phenomenon (it is something that people do in socio-historical contexts), and 
it is fallible rather than absolute or merely relative (2010, 2). The realist approach to 
knowledge as a re-valuing of disciplinarity, as Green, 2010 terms it, does not go 
uncontested by him or others (e.g. Balarin 2008), although Moore (2013) provides a 
strong defence. However, I am not claiming for currere the development of 
epistemologists but informed practitioners able to discern practice issues through the 
lens of their professional knowledge within the social reality of their profession.  
Section 2: Curriculum issues 
Much has been written about the importance of curriculum studies to the realisation of 
the true function of any constructed curriculum. Kelly (2011) provides a good general 
introduction to the scope of this analysis and what curriculum itself might be. Important 
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as she shows much of this work to be (and often conflated as subject–discipline 
knowledge in higher education institutions), Kelly’s point is her metaphysical and 
epistemological analysis of curriculum and the evident lack of a sustained and 
ontological approach to much of what is considered as the content in curriculum studies. 
There have been others central to this more critical ontological stance on curriculum and 
pedagogy: Freire (see especially his work on higher education curriculum, 1994), 
Giroux and Giroux (2004), Greene (1988) and Pinar (2011) are perhaps the most 
significant. Their foci have been on emancipation, liberty, freedom and the subjugation 
of knowledge in curriculum development and pedagogical implementation, and their 
work offers analogies for the discussion of how workplace practice knowledge might be 
treated in formal education. 
Efforts have been made to consider curriculum from the perspective not of 
educational institutions but of the workplace. Billett (2006, 2009), along with Boreham 
(2004) and Mulcahy (2011), has presented notions of workplace curricula. Indeed, 
Billett goes so far as to claim that there is ‘an urgent need for workplace curriculum 
practices and principles to be identified, elaborated and evaluated’ (2006, 31). He 
suggests that the goal for such a curriculum is to ‘assist individuals’ identity and realise 
their full vocational potential’ (2006, 34). He draws what seems to be an important 
distinction between the structured prudence of the learning environment of formal 
institutions and the workplace, where the benefit of the learning is mainly for others 
(owners, affiliations, cliques and participation therein). Billett’s recognition of the 
intended, enacted and experienced curriculum has practical implications for the 
integration of work experience in higher education (Billett 2009), yet it pulls back from 
engaging in a more radical approach in which critical ontological theorists such as 
Greene and especially Pinar engage. Billett does refer to currere as a conceptual way of 
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organising learning in the workplace but, unlike Pinar’s more radical use (to explore 
what this more profound way of being might be), his use of pathways of structured 
assimilation into workplace practices lacks real, liberating notions of what the future 
workplace might hold for the being of a worker. The use of curriculum is akin to the 
‘work process’ knowledge of Boreham (2004) and is based on the premise that much of 
the knowledge that guides work is created in the process of work itself and in the 
performance of the practice. 
These practices are often evidence of tacit knowledge that Polanyi (1958) has 
suggested is both inaccessible to its possessor and incommunicable to others. Moreover, 
it is situational and, often, knowledge without power for it is neither readily 
recognisable nor tradable, whilst critical to organisational success. Such knowledge is 
revealed in practice situations and suggests that its nurture requires both a 
presupposition of technical knowledge and experience. This brings into question a 
system of privileging external accreditation through modularity that has excluded 
practice in favour of instrumental measures of accepted knowledge, often maintained 
through the knowledge of the powerful enshrined in traditional curricula. It does not 
exclude formal instruction on what is known about a subject, but argues that it ought to 
be provided in the context of the practice. Moreover, this unexpressed and often 
embodied knowledge is knowledge learned and expressed through others. It is shared, 
whether in the presence of others or alone for, as knowledge of practices, it has itself a 
collaborative history fostered or inhibited by the nature of the facilitating environment 
(e.g. Evans et al. 2006). Practices are a symbiosis of being within a process of being that 
is experienced, but which has a temporality of joint construction. It is a temporal event 
in which the past of its learning and the future of its effect are acknowledged in the 
phenomenological presentation of the practice. 
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There is little doubt that higher education helps create, store and disseminate the 
conceptual knowledge that facilitates the capabilities for enactment within a 
professional practice. It allows a systematic encounter with a repository of specified 
knowledge that formulates the nature of a profession’s know-how. The relationship 
between a formal higher education provider and the practice of professional practice is 
complex, as Barnett (2009) has indicated. Moreover, Schwandt argues compellingly that 
the contemporary higher education sector struggles with ‘how to frame teaching, 
learning and inquiry in the professional practice fields’ (2005, 313). 
These forms of contextualisation, however, ought not to be external to any core 
of the currere: they are critical to its realisation. Traditional disciplines leading to what 
might be known as the traditional professions—Law, Medicine, the Church—may still 
have a direct relevance, but in the newer interdisciplinary professions of Sports 
Therapy, Leisure, Tourism and Business there is no such reliance on single-discipline 
conceptual knowledge, and practice is central to, and mingled with, conceptual 
pragmatic knowledge to form professional practice. Here the relationships between 
profession, workplace and education are intertwined, not as in transition between two 
separate experiences but in the context of widening networks of collaboration and 
achievement. It is here, in the discursive spaces where the forms of knowledge are not 
clearly identified with specific disciplines, that attention should be concentrated. This is 
separate practice knowledge as located at their point of engagement. This epistemology 
position is not in opposition to either constructivist or positivist claims of what is taken 
as knowledge, or that knowledge can exist in the sense that there are real things we can 
know about, which offers a phenomenological sense: what we take to be known as real 
is constructed also within our social or professional contexts. This continuum is 
intentionally premised on a condition that conceptual knowledge forms a part of all 
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occupational knowledge that Winch (2010), Wheelahan (2009) and Young (2008) have 
recognised as important for epistemological, economic and social justice reasons. 
Section 3: A currere of professional practice 
The phenomenological approach inherent in currere makes visible the importance of 
conceptual knowledge in the development of practice and the extent to which it is a 
prerequisite of the needs of practice. Clearly, there is value in the Muller (2009) model 
of higher education curriculum design for the intertwining of formal higher education 
with that of the workplace, where certain levels of conceptual knowledge are demanded 
by the technical capabilities that make a student eligible for a chosen professional 
practice. However, the complex conversation that is at the core of the currere is an 
understanding of ‘the contribution that academic studies makes to one’s life’ (2011, 43). 
It is a conversation with oneself and others: running a ‘thread through academic 
knowledge as an ongoing project of self-understanding in which one becomes mobilized 
for engagement in the world’ (ibid: 47). It thus introduces a temporality to the 
understanding of practice as structured in the profession. This is presented through their 
relation to its history and future and determines the form of the practices of the present. 
It accepts the disciplinarity of knowledge, as does social realism, and seeks to 
understand how its meaning is grasped in the experience of becoming, in our case, a 
professional. Such an approach may lead to what Thomson has called an ‘ontological 
revolution’ (2005, 159) in the way we approach education.  
Dall’Alba and Barnacle summarise the views of both Thomson and Heidegger 
as, if ‘being and knowing are inextricable, then exploring this interdependence provides 
a means of not only problematising but also transforming higher education’ (Heidegger 
2007, 682). This view is voiced by Barnett, who argues that we are ‘urgently in need of 
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an ontological turn in our thinking about higher education’ (2007, 9). Taking an 
ontological perspective requires a totalising currere that attempts to blend the 
conceptual needs of caring engagement, reflection and critical practices with the 
presenting phenomena of the practice in ways that enable the experience to be 
understood and facilitates the agency of the candidate in the being of a professional life. 
To facilitate this, the becoming of being discourse of currere involves the integration of 
‘ways of knowing, acting and being within a broad range of practices’ (Dall’Alba and 
Barnacle (2007, 683) leading to a process of becoming; an unfolding and transformation 
of the self over time’ (Dall’Alba 2009, 43). This is not a call for sequencing work and 
practice as separate but interleaved activities such as internships and work placements, 
but a radical rethink of the nature of higher education institutions’ relationship to 
professional practice.  
Here, a warning appears to those involved concerning the chosen language for 
this conversation—the language of neither university nor practice must be allowed to 
dictate its form, as this determines the meaning of practice. An emergent language of 
professional becoming is needed, distinct from the either/or of the contesting sites of 
learning. This is an approach advocated by Rorty (1999) and requires us creatively to 
facilitate a new way of talking about professional becoming. It needs a language of 
professional agency to contribute to and be contingent upon the emerging vocabulary of 
professions. This is not to deny that there has been dialogue about the integration of 
workplaces and educational institutions (Billett 2009; Johnson and Hager 2008), but 
that it was negotiated by means of word games that are resolved by the most powerful. I 
am not proposing to cross-reference terms developed in either location to create a 
dialogue of opposing meanings, but to nurture a fresh, generative language of 
professional ontology with its own metaphorical meanings and symbols. Take, for 
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instance, the word ‘breach’ in the UK’s nursing profession. In the world of Accident 
and Emergency the term is laden with meaning derived not from gynaecology but 
managerial expediency. It refers to any occasion where someone has to wait in Casualty 
for four hours or more, and has a political meaning almost more powerful than a 
medical emergency, surrounded by many issues that contextualise the reality of nursing 
practice. 
In Heideggerian terms, what is hidden and taken-for-granted in our 
everydayness is made conspicuous for investigation into the social and cultural nature 
of what is taken to be professional. The learning of situated practices is vital to 
understanding how professionals relate to their work world (Pigrum 2007). Through an 
understanding of how the phenomena of the professional world appear to professions 
and are disclosed by them, it is possible to grasp the everyday meaning of the 
professional practice. It is possible to comprehend how professionals reveal their 
identities through the development of practices grounded in equipmental references and 
functionality. Indeed, Billett holds that ‘more than an end in itself, participation in 
activities, such as those in workplaces, incites change in individuals’ understanding and 
capacities—that is it constitutes learning’ (2004, 315). The ‘what’ of learning in the 
professional has been mapped by Eraut (2004) as a heuristic device to assist research 
and understanding. 
How such a currere might proceed is not to be established by separating 
preparation for professional candidature from the context of that profession’s working 
environment (the assumption is that graduate employment may be termed higher-level 
engagement in society and considered as professional endeavour), that is, to distinguish 
between workplace proration and professional body preparation. This distinction applies 
more to the licensed professions than professionalised occupations, but even here it is 
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important if workplace practices, as opposed to professional practices, are not to erode 
the values and principles of the profession (for instance bribes, personal advancement, 
bullying, research fraud and theft). The preparation has to be flexible in duration, 
location and practice. Moreover, it needs to transmit professional knowledge from one 
generation to another whilst offering critical opportunities to ensure the knowledge’s 
historicity is still relevant to its present use. This knowledge needs to be relied upon by 
the profession, the professional and the society in which the professional practice is 
enacted. In this the constraints of the structures of the profession must be recognised. It 
is this professional knowledge that is powerful for the professional existing curriculum, 
but which is reviewed within the currere. This will have an impact how the profession 
is defined through cultural rituals and symbols that exclude others and, notably, it shifts 
personal agency to the collective. 
As we seek the powerful knowledge and practices of the profession, this 
approach has a significant policy impact. It reclaims a central role for the profession, 
not just in the selection of content but in nurturing the tacit situated learning that helps 
the expert professional emerge from the novice. This will see the reversal of an 
academic model institutionalised as a part of higher education. It makes professional 
bodies stronger and independent of the universities in their recruitment and gives them 
control over their relationship with the university supplying ‘technicalist knowledge’ 
with routes in academic disciplines in modes of delivery acceptable for development of 
professional practice. This will clarify that what is considered professional knowledge, 
and the power attributed to it, will be sanctioned by the professional body.  
So what might a currere for professional practice look like? It would be centred 
on reflective practices seeking an understanding of what drives our practice 
autobiographically, either in conversation of through personal narrative. It would create 
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a path, not a map, along which the profession might grow through its members rather 
than instrumentally through its regulations. It would enrich the candidates for the 
profession but engage them in an explicit understanding of how and why personal 
practice changes, and provide a deep understanding of the structural principles upon 
which the profession is based. The power and the justification of the profession’s 
rituals, knowledge and principles that support the structures shaping practice would be 
revealed.  
Based on a reflective stance, the currere of professional development would 
assume the propositional transfer of knowledge and a realist epistemological stance. 
(Winch’s 2013 discussion of the duree of agency as a taking a stance on one’s being 
offers helpful insights into the blending of what he calls propositional and practical 
knowledge, especially the role of liberal education in this process.) It would differ from 
current forms of university taught courses in that it would require professionals to 
reflect on their practice and synthesise this in the context of their own history and build, 
dialectically, into the professional training. This way the professional is, at all stages of 
becoming a professional, informing the profession of what it ought to be—not the other 
way around. As continuing professional training, currere would require discursive 
engagement of professionals with others about their practice, its boundaries and how 
these might change the accepted protocol in terms of what is taken as knowledge, the 
practices themselves and the structure of the profession. Profession currere is structured 
around questioning practice, not accepting authorised authority. It requires tutorials, 
work groups and located learning so that practice, not just the disembodied facts, is 
conveyed. It will mean that personal values of the professionals may counter the 
principles of the profession. It will call for change and a more responsive profession, 
evaluating maturing practice rather than disengaged knowledge. It is where practice-
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based learning is integrated, informed but not driven by the knowledge of the powerful 
in small partnerships of practising becoming a professional, informing each other’s 
practice not for uniformity but for diversity, with the constraints of what might be 
identified as a specific professional practitioner. 
A currere of professional practice will:  
• Mediate local practices through professional engagement. 
• Engage in, and with, professional practices and the needs of emerging networks 
of practice competence when faced with need policy changes. 
• Move from a didactic-dominated conceptual form of provision of context-
independent knowledge to a broader pedagogical base where the pedagogical 
tempo and the relationship between conceptual and contextual knowledge is 
delivered as an integrated (but boundary clarified) way, so as to encourage 
participation in professional practice and subsequently to support professional 
becoming. 
• Pragmatically resolve quality; the responsibility for any formal qualification is 
jointly determined by the professional body and employer association or 
relevant body. 
• Make the duration of the professional practice training a function of the 
profession’s need, not a pre-set period for university degrees and the economics 
of cohort teaching. 
• The ontological stance of professionals would be supported during their 
becoming, through continued professional development that would inform 
practice and conceptual knowledge revealed through such practices.  
• Satisfy employers over the employment potential of those graduating from these 
professions and. As successful candidates would evidently be ‘becoming 
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professional’ from the outset of their higher education training (note: not defined 
as university education) in ways that are phenomenologically located in 
professional practice and values, it is rational that employers will appreciate that 
they are ‘workplace tested’.  
• Remove the university (but not the specialised institute run by the professional 
body—teaching hospital, engineering college, institutes of finance and 
accounting)—from the accreditation function of professional status but retain it 
as a source of discipline knowledge. Universities flourish as knowledge creation 
and transfer bodies with a distinctive and social function.3 In Bernsteinian terms, 
their role is with the singularities of disciplines, whereas professional bodies 
deal with the realisation of knowledge for their professional practices.  
The currere ‘shifts the emphasis from the duration of learning and the institution 
where it takes place to the actual learning and the knowledge, skills and competences 
that have been or should be acquired through the learning’ (CEDEFOP 2011). This shift 
may incur the realignment of values to those principles that define a specific profession. 
To achieve this transition from novice to professional involves facing what Young calls 
‘a fundamental incompatibility between acquiring skills and demonstrating competence 
on the one hand and acquiring knowledge on the other’ (2008, 7). Such a position 
requires the profession to determine what knowledge is context-dependent and what is 
not, and how knowledge can be acquired. In the first group, procedures and regulations 
can assist but the reality of the practice situation determines its value, whereas content-
independent conceptual knowledge determines what is powerful knowledge for 
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professional membership (Young 2008). This chimes with Muller’s (2009) analysis of 
university curricula, but not the ontological realism of a currere of being a professional. 
The currere needs assessment by demonstration, attested to by all those whose 
judgement on the professional candidate practice is necessary for admittance to a 
particular community of practice. It requires the de- and re-construction of the role of 
the university as the sole provider of higher conceptual learning and of the profession as 
a self-servicing, profit-optimising entity.  
Professional becoming becomes the core of the educational endeavour. This 
involves mixing conceptual and everyday practice in the shaping of the experiences of 
the potential professional candidate. It requires a conversation that stretches from the 
past into the future. Students cease to be students of accountancy and become 
candidates for accountants instead, as if this was some neutral discipline. The same 
applies to tourist management or nursing, where students begin a process through which 
they become candidates for admittance to the community of practice of tour managers 
or nurses. This switch in name is important: it shapes the direction and form of learning. 
Moreover, students are involved in a process of moral edification that includes civic 
liberal studies with the aim of ensuring an awareness of basic shared responsibilities to 
others, of respect, duty and gratitude. This sets the context of a higher-level analytical 
and critical education. This is within the short-term goal of the currere, to qualify the 
candidate as a professional in their community of practice. 
This has clear consequences for our understanding of higher education, 
professions and the nature of the workplace, as this model neither restricts higher 
education to a formal institution, nor leaves the profession and workplaces solely as 
places for profit and surveillance, but as a place for emancipation and challenge. 
Naturally, professional candidates have the scope to influence the values of their 
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profession and their workplace, and facing the difference in personal values and group 
principles is a matter of personal agency. However, the full integration of each world 
means confronting how the knowledge of the power can be tested for the economic 
enhancement for the wider common good.  
Such change, where the phenomena of practice determine the content dependent 
knowledge of the currere, opens spaces to explore a dialectic and ontological 
conversation between professionals and their profession, as well as a reflexive 
conversation about their personal way of being and the stance they take on their 
expertise. This may confront those who determine what has previously been the domain 
of the professional hierarchy through questioning why, and on what basis, specific 
knowledge is included in the definition of the profession. The opening up of 
possibilities beyond a structured curriculum for professional certification and continued 
development may well disrupt professional authority and structures. These include the 
professions’ relationship with university provision. The currere attempts to 
reconceptualise reflexively the curriculum of being a certified professional as an 
ontology in the lifelong pursuit of becoming professional. It accepts that knowledge is 
selected and recontextualised for its relevance to the profession, but questions the 
process and looks to develop it through the currere. It thus changes the institutional 
nature of the profession from a hegemony to an emergent organisation of expert labour 
(Fincham 2012). With this change, all those structures that once protected its hegemonic 
position will also need to be re-negotiated.  
Final thoughts 
The tone of this paper has proposed ways of radically restructuring the barriers between 
professional status and university education by exposing them to the phenomenological 
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furnace of professional practice. Radical but not new, professional education outside of 
the core mission of the university was advocated by Mill in his Inaugural Address 
([1867] 2000). Given our present situation, it requires a special understanding of 
professional higher education and is an addition to the re-defining of the role of the 
professional body and the idea of university, as some may see a back-to-the-future 
argument (see Reid et al’s 2008 discussion on the formation of a professional identity). 
This is an argument for a radical revision of the higher education professional and 
vocational curriculum, along the phenomenological lines of a currere. It would be 
mistaken, however, to assume aspects of this ontological approach have not been 
developed in the past. Black Mountain College (now closed) and Alverno College,4 
both liberal arts colleges in the USA, had and have a similar ethos if not practice. 
Moreover, there are signs of departments and units grouping within the existing 
structure of university education and blending contextual and conceptual knowledge in 
ways indicated here, despite the constraints of power and structure that inhibit genuine 
integration. 
The new structure suggested above will call for a more nuanced notion of human 
capital. The benchmarks of independent knowledge, susceptible to the knowledge of the 
powerful, will be less reliable for judging economic performance. Discipline knowledge 
will be best situated in the university and expert practice in the professions. It will also 
call for a more diverse discussion of human capital if used for policy purposes as the 
tacit knowledge of practice is less easily commoditised.  
. 
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